Crypto Bridges Lost Hundreds of Millions in 2026. Why Bridge Hacks Keep Working?
Bridge exploits in 2026 broke trust assumptions, not cryptography. Here is the mechanism behind each hack, the fix that followed, and what stays unconfirmed.
By Anmol BillaSenior Analyst

The bridge attacks of 2026 mostly did not break cryptography. They broke a trust assumption instead: one verifier, one admin key, or one unchecked line of code. The two largest, Drift on 1 April and KelpDAO on 18 April, cost about $575 million between them and were preliminarily tied to North Korea's Lazarus Group.
For a reader holding assets on a bridge, or lending against bridged collateral, the pattern matters more than the total. The largest losses did not come from clever maths. They came from setups where one signature, one node, or one missing check was enough to move the money.
Key Facts
- KelpDAO was exploited for approximately $290 million on 18 April 2026 through a 1-of-1 DVN setup with LayerZero Labs as sole verifier, per LayerZero's incident statement.
- Drift Protocol lost about $285 million on 1 April 2026, with on-chain staging that began on 11 March, per TRM Labs.
- The Arbitrum Security Council recovered 30,766 ETH from the KelpDAO attacker in a 9-of-12 vote on 21 April 2026, per Galaxy Research.
- AFX Trade lost 24,150,000 USDC on 22 July 2026 after five compromised validator signatures cleared a two-thirds quorum.
- LayerZero said it will no longer sign or attest messages from any application running a 1-of-1 DVN configuration, per Galaxy Research.
KelpDAO: One Verifier and a Forged Packet
On 18 April 2026, KelpDAO was exploited for approximately $290 million. In its own incident statement, LayerZero wrote: "On April 18, 2026, KelpDAO was exploited for approximately $290M. Preliminary indicators suggest attribution to a highly-sophisticated state actor, likely DPRK's Lazarus Group, more specifically TraderTraitor."
The configuration is the part that travelled. KelpDAO's OApp configuration at the time relied on a 1-of-1 DVN setup, with LayerZero Labs as the sole verifier, LayerZero said. One verifier means one point of trust.
Galaxy Research traced the mechanics. The attacker exploited that single-verifier configuration on KelpDAO's LayerZero omnichain fungible token (OFT) bridge to unlock 116,500 rsETH from the Ethereum mainnet escrow. At 17:35 UTC, a forged LayerZero packet claiming to originate from Unichain was delivered to the rsETH OFT adapter, which released the 116,500 rsETH to the attacker in a single transaction.
LayerZero's own account of the cause is narrower than key theft. It said the attack's subject was "the poisoning of the downstream RPC infrastructure used by the LayerZero Labs DVN," and that the DVN instance and its signing keys were never compromised. The attacker, LayerZero said, gained access to the list of RPCs the DVN uses, compromised two independent nodes running on separate clusters, swapped out the binaries running the op-geth nodes, and ran a DDoS to force a failover onto the poisoned nodes.
The stolen rsETH did not sit still. The attacker deposited it as collateral on Aave, Compound and Euler, mostly on Ethereum L1 and Arbitrum, and borrowed an estimated $236 million in WETH and wstETH against it, per Galaxy. Within 48 hours, DeFi's total value locked fell by roughly $13 billion, from about $99.5 billion to about $86.3 billion.
Arbitrum's Security Council used emergency powers to seize 30,766 ETH from the attacker's wallet on-chain. Galaxy dates the move precisely: on 21 April at 11:26 p.m. ET, the council, a 12-member multisignature wallet, executed a 9-of-12 vote to recover the 30,766 ETH the attacker had bridged to Arbitrum.
The recovery did not erase the loss. Aave's estimated bad debt from the exploit stands at $123.7 million under uniform socialization of losses, or $230.1 million if the losses are isolated to L2 rsETH, per Galaxy. That gap lands on lenders rather than the attacker.
Drift: Three Weeks of Setup, Twelve Minutes of Draining
Drift Protocol lost about $285 million on 1 April 2026. Elliptic put the figure at roughly $286 million, and Chainalysis also used $285 million, so the loss is reported at about $285 million to $286 million.
The cause was not a smart contract bug. PeckShield's preliminary assessment pointed to a compromise of the protocol's administrator private keys, giving the attacker privileged access to withdrawals and admin controls. TRM Labs described the same event as social engineering of multisig signers into pre-signing hidden authorizations, combined with a zero-timelock Security Council migration that removed the protocol's last line of defence.
The setup ran for weeks before the drain. On-chain staging began on 11 March, nearly three weeks before the 1 April execution, per TRM. The attackers used Solana's durable nonces feature, which lets transactions be signed in advance and executed later, to get Drift's Security Council members to unknowingly pre-approve the takeover. On 1 April at 16:05:18 UTC the first pre-signed transaction proposed transferring admin control, and one second later, at 16:05:19 UTC, the second approved and executed it.
Then the money moved: 31 withdrawal transactions in roughly 12 minutes, draining real assets including USDC and JLP. The largest single transfer was about 41.7 million JLP tokens, worth roughly $155 million at the time, per Elliptic. Drift's TVL fell from about $550 million to under $250 million.
AFX Trade, Verus and the October Drains
AFX Trade's attack ran on 22 July at 21:30 UTC, when attackers withdrew 24,150,000 USDC from the protocol's custodial bridge on Arbitrum. They obtained private keys from five validators to reach the required quorum to confirm the transaction. The bridge contract had a 200-second challenge period, and no challenge was filed, so the contract validated the transaction automatically. The funds were bridged to Ethereum and swapped for 12,467.5 ETH at an average price of roughly $1,937.
The VerusCoin bridge was hit twice: $11.6 million in May, then $7.54 million in July, per an account of the year's bridge losses. The reported vulnerability lay in the VerusProof.checkExportAndTransfers function, which checked the transfer hash but did not verify that the assets were actually backed on the Verus side. Both the figures and the mechanism rest on a single account and are unconfirmed.
In a seven-day stretch in October, three more bridges lost funds. Cysic lost control of its minting path on 17 October, WAX released assets it never received on 22 October, and Initia halted its whole chain on 23 October. The combined figure of roughly $3.5 million for those three is unconfirmed: other accounts put Cysic at about $727,000 and Initia at about $2.7 million, which do not sum to $3.5 million.
The Sandbox Mint: $49 Billion on Paper, $675,000 in Practice
The Sandbox bridge exploit shows how far a mint's face value sits from what an attacker actually keeps. An attacker minted roughly 14.9 billion unbacked SAND across two wallet addresses, exploiting a cross-chain bridge connecting The Sandbox to Base and BNB Smart Chain, according to an account of the incident. Security firm Blockaid pegged the face value of the fraudulent mint at close to $49 billion.
The extraction was far smaller. Actual on-chain removal was closer to 14.75 million SAND, worth about $675,000, plus roughly 79.74 ETH pulled out before the team froze the bridge. PeckShield first flagged the exploit on 21 August 2026. These details rest on a single account and are unconfirmed.
What the Fixes Changed, and What Is Unconfirmed
The fixes so far are per project, which is the point. LayerZero said it will no longer sign or attest messages from any application running a 1-of-1 DVN configuration, a policy that binds only apps that use its DVN. Arbitrum's council used emergency powers to claw back bridged ETH.
Elsewhere the response was a pause and a patch. WAX paused bridge processing on 22 October and told users to hold off on transfers; on 23 October it said processing resumed with a fix, additional safeguards and per-transfer limits. Initia halted its L1 and connected rollups at 15:41:30 UTC on 23 October, about 42 minutes after the exploit began at 14:59:26 UTC.
The totals do not agree, because the scopes differ. Bitcoin Foundation counted at least eight major bridge exploits in 2026 with total losses of $328.6 million as of July. A separate tally, citing Forbes and CertiK, put DeFi losses at $1.3 billion in the first eight months of 2026, a figure that covers DeFi broadly, not bridges alone. The two are not reconciled.
KelpDAO's loss is cited as $290 million and $292 million; the 116,500 rsETH figure is consistent. Drift's loss is reported between $285 million and $286 million, and no primary Drift post-mortem page was reachable. The AFX Trade 200-second dispute window, and a claim that 47% of LayerZero OApp contracts, more than 1,200 of them, share one single-verifier configuration, each rest on a single account.
Timeline: The 2026 Bridge Exploits
- 11 March 2026: Drift on-chain staging begins.
- 1 April 2026: Drift exploited, about $285 million.
- 18 April 2026: KelpDAO exploited, about $290 million.
- 20 April 2026: LayerZero publishes its post-mortem, describing RPC poisoning.
- 21 April 2026: Arbitrum Security Council recovers 30,766 ETH.
- 22 July 2026: AFX Trade loses 24,150,000 USDC.
- 21 August 2026: PeckShield flags the Sandbox SAND mint.
- 17 October 2026: Cysic loses control of its minting path.
- 22 October 2026: WAX releases assets it never received and pauses its bridge.
- 23 October 2026: Initia halts its chain; WAX resumes with a fix.
What Would Change the Answer
The next hard evidence would come from the projects themselves. A full post-mortem and an audit from The Sandbox, reported as still owing both before it reopens Base and BSC bridging, would confirm the mechanics and the final loss there. A technical post-mortem from Initia was still outstanding as of the sources reviewed. And a primary Drift report would settle whether the loss was $285 million or $286 million.
Until those land, the narrow read is the safe one. The 2026 bridge attacks that cost the most each depended on a single point of trust, and the fixes announced so far are scoped to the bridge that was hit, not to the class of attack.

Anmol Billa
Anmol Billa is a Senior Analyst at Altcoin Buzz, with over five years of experience working across cryptocurrency markets and the broader digital asset industry. His work focuses on technical analysis, market research, investment insights, and evaluating emerging opportunities within the crypto ecosystem. At Altcoin Buzz, Anmol contributes to technical market analysis, research-driven insights, pitch decks, and funding-related initiatives. His experience combines analytical thinking with a practical understanding of crypto markets, helping translate market trends and emerging projects into clear, actionable insights for readers and industry stakeholders.
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